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J.D.B. v. NORTH CAROLINA: AN APPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF 
MIRANDA TO ACCOUNT FOR AGE IN JUVENILE 
INTERROGATIONS  
HANNA MARIE SHEEHAN∗ 
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,1 the Supreme Court of the United 
States reevaluated the Miranda2 in-custody test with respect to juvenile 
criminal offenders.  The Court determined that age must be consid-
ered for Miranda purposes when law enforcement officers interrogate 
juveniles.3  The Court appropriately changed the rule with regards to 
juvenile offenders based on the cognitive differences between juve-
niles and adults, mainly relying on the different cognitive processes 
and abilities that adults and juveniles employ to comprehend the cir-
cumstances surrounding custodial situations.4  The Supreme Court’s 
rule does not completely destroy the previous Miranda rule; rather, it 
merely adds the single factor of age, and asks how a reasonable per-
son in the defendant’s position would view his ability to end the ques-
tioning.5  The Supreme Court appropriately developed a rule that 
comports with a progressive trend of establishing separate, categorical 
rules for juveniles.6  Juveniles should be considered under different 
paradigms because of their physical under-development and de-
creased capacity to evaluate, process, and understand situations where 
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 1. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).   
 2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
 3. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.   
 4. See infra Part IV.A.  
 5. See infra Part IV.B. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C.1.  
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their rights may be compromised.7  While the Court intended the rule 
from J.D.B. to apply to any instance in which a juvenile is questioned 
in a custodial setting, it is possible to apply this rule to another dis-
crete class of individuals: cognitively deficient adults.8  Due to the sim-
ilar comprehensive abilities of cognitively deficient adults and juve-
niles, the rule appropriately could apply to this group of adult 
offenders.9   
I.  THE CASE 
On September 24, 2005, two home break-ins occurred in Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina, resulting in the theft of several items including a 
camera and jewelry.10  Later that day, the police stopped and briefly 
spoke to J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old seventh grader enrolled in special 
education courses, when he was discovered near one of the targeted 
residences.11  After this encounter, the police received information 
that J.D.B. had been seen in possession of one of the stolen goods, a 
digital camera, and had passed it along to another student at his mid-
dle school.12  With this information, Officer DiCostanzo of the Chapel 
Hill Police Department went to J.D.B.’s school to speak with him.13  
After Officer Dicostanzo arrived at the school, a “uniformed school 
resource officer” removed J.D.B. from class and escorted him to the 
conference room where the door was subsequently shut but not 
locked.14  Three other adults were in the room when J.D.B. arrived 
with the school officer: Officer DiCostanzo, the assistant principal, 
and an intern.15   
Once the door to the room was shut, Officer DiCostanzo asked 
J.D.B. if he would answer questions regarding the recent break-ins.16  
J.D.B. consented and initially denied any involvement in the crimes; 
 
 7. See infra Part IV.C.1.  
 8. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 9. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 10. In re J.B., No. COA06-662, 2007 WL 1412457, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. May 15, 2007), 
aff’d, 674 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2394 (2011).    
 11. Id. at *1. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.   
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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he admitted, however, that he was in the area when the break-ins oc-
curred.17  At that point in the questioning, Officer DiCostanzo re-
vealed to J.D.B. that the stolen camera had been recovered.18  Follow-
ing this revelation, the assistant principal pressured J.D.B. to “‘do the 
right thing’ and tell the truth.”19  J.D.B. then inquired if he would “be 
in trouble” if he gathered and returned the stolen items, to which Of-
ficer DiCostanzo replied that it would be beneficial for J.D.B. to re-
turn the items but, regardless, “this thing is going to court.”20  Officer 
DiCostanzo then told J.D.B. that he might be able to seek an order to 
hold him in juvenile detention until the trial, presumably if he did 
not return the stolen items.21   
Next, Officer DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that “he was not under 
arrest, that he was free to leave, and that he was not required to speak 
about the case.”22  Following this statement, Officer DiCostanzo asked 
J.D.B. if he understood the situation, and J.D.B. nodded his head in 
consent.23  Then J.D.B. explained in detail how he and a friend broke 
into the two houses and stole various items.24  At Officer DiCostanzo’s 
request, he provided a written statement of these admissions.25  After 
J.D.B. wrote down the requested statement, the school bell signaling 
the end of the day rang, and Officer DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that 
“he should leave so that he would not miss his bus.”26  By the time 
J.D.B. left the office, the interview had been going on for approxi-
mately “30 to 45 minutes.”27   
On October 19, 2005, the State filed two juvenile petitions 
against J.D.B. alleging that he was a delinquent as a result of his 
 
 17. Id.  He told Officer DiCostanzo that he was in the area “going door-to-door trying 
to be hired to do small jobs.”  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at *2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  Following the conclusion of the interview, Officer DiCostanzo went to J.D.B.’s 
residence with another officer, spoke with J.D.B. again, acquired a search warrant for 
J.D.B.’s house and went with J.D.B. around the house and the surrounding area in a search 
to recover the other stolen items.  Id. 
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“breaking and entering and larceny.”28  Prior to the adjudication 
hearing, J.D.B. moved to suppress the statements he made in the 
school office under the theory that he was in custody during the in-
terrogation and was not afforded the necessary Miranda warnings.29  
The district court ultimately decided that J.D.B. was not in custody 
during the interrogation and denied his motion to suppress; the dis-
trict court did not, however, offer its reasoning why J.D.B. was not in 
custody.30  At the disposition hearing, J.D.B. admitted the allegations 
in the petitions but renewed his arguments regarding the motion to 
suppress; despite this, based on J.D.B.’s admission, the court adjudi-
cated J.D.B. a delinquent juvenile.31 
On appeal, J.D.B. asked the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
to find that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his 
statements to the police.32  In evaluating the trial court’s decision, the 
court of appeals defined the in-custody test as requiring an objective 
evaluation of whether, under the “totality of the[] circumstances, a 
reasonable person standing in the place of the juvenile would have 
believed that he was restrained in his movement to the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest.”33  The appellate court ultimately concluded 
that the trial court must offer definitive findings of fact necessary to 
support its determination that J.D.B. was not in custody at the time of 
the interrogation and remanded the case.34  On remand, the trial 
court made “findings of fact [and] conclusions of law” to support the 
denial of J.D.B.’s motion to suppress.35  J.D.B. again appealed.36 
On J.D.B.’s second appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Caro-
lina, the court fully evaluated the trial court’s findings of fact as well 
as the legal standard.37  The court ultimately concluded that the trial 
court did not commit error with respect to the legal conclusion that 
 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at *3. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *5 (quoting In re W.R., 634 S.E.2d 923, 926–27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795, 797 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 
2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 36. Id. at 798. 
 37. Id. at 800–01. 
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J.D.B. was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda when Officer 
DiCostanzo interrogated him at school.38  The state appellate court 
stated that numerous factors contributed to this determination: J.D.B. 
was not locked in the room and therefore maintained his freedom to 
leave, he was not constrained, he was not placed under arrest, and Of-
ficer DiCostanzo told him that he did not have to answer any of the 
questions posed to him.39  The majority decision also stated that age 
by itself does not play a role in determining whether an individual has 
been placed in custody for Miranda purposes.40  The state appellate 
court determined that “a reasonable person in J.D.B.’s position would 
not have believed himself to be in custody or deprived of his freedom 
of action in some significant way” for the purposes of Miranda and af-
firmed the lower court’s decision.41   
In dissent, Judge Beasley disagreed with the majority’s ruling that 
J.D.B. had not been in custody for the purposes of Miranda.42  Judge 
Beasley stated that the court must evaluate “the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation and . . . the effect those circumstances 
would have on a reasonable person.”43  She then stated she would 
consider a juvenile’s age as a factor in the “reasonable person” test 
because age may influence the individual’s belief of whether he is in 
custody.44  Judge Beasley would have held that J.D.B. was in custody 
because “a uniformed school resource officer” had taken him to the 
school office, the door to the office was closed after he entered, and 
“four adults were in the room” when Officer DiCostanzo questioned 
J.D.B.45  Primarily, she focused on the facts that after J.D.B. answered 
the questions posed to him, he was not released to class, and the of-
 
 38. Id. at 799–800. 
 39. Id. at 799. 
 40. Id. at 800.  The majority stated, however, that “an individual’s subnormal mental 
capacity and age are factors to be considered when determining whether a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of rights has been made.”  Id.    
 41. Id. at 800–01.  
 42. Id. at 801 (Beasley, J., dissenting).  
 43. Id. at 802 (citing State v. Garcia, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (N.C. 2004)).  
 44. Id.  Judge Beasley pointed out that “[t]o hold otherwise would lead to the absurd 
result that, when required to determine whether a ‘reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation’ would consider himself in custody, courts would apply exactly the same analysis, 
regardless of whether the individual was eight or thirty-eight years old.”  Id.   
 45. Id.  Judge Beasley made this determination with the knowledge that J.D.B. was nei-
ther under extra restraints in the interrogatory situation nor locked in the room.  Id. at 
803. 
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ficer and the assistant principal would not accept the answers he gave 
them.46  Finally, Judge Beasley commented that the pseudo-warning 
that Officer DiCostanzo gave J.D.B. after his self-incriminating state-
ments was not enough to admit the statements under the in-custody 
analysis because, according to her, J.D.B. was in custody from the 
moment he walked into the office; therefore, the post-confession reci-
tation of Miranda warnings was not sufficient.47 
Following the decision of the state appellate court, J.D.B. ap-
pealed “as of right” under North Carolina law to the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina.48  Mirroring Judge Beasley’s dissent, J.D.B. argued 
that he was in custody when he was questioned and that age should be 
considered for Miranda purposes.49  The state supreme court followed 
the same line of reasoning the state appellate court did in determin-
ing that J.D.B. was not in custody when Officer DiCostanzo interro-
gated him.50  The state supreme court disagreed with Judge Beasley’s 
argument that age should be a factor in deciding if a person is in cus-
tody; instead, the court found age irrelevant for the in-custody analysis 
because a consideration of age was contrary to the “objective ‘reason-
able person’” inquiry necessary for Miranda purposes.51  Consequent-
ly, the court affirmed the decision of the state appellate court that 
J.D.B. was not entitled to the protections of Miranda.52  Two judges 
filed separate dissenting opinions arguing that J.D.B. was in custody 
for Miranda purposes.53  The Supreme Court of the United States 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 802–04. 
 48. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 137 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).    
 49. Id.  In North Carolina, an individual may appeal “as of right” to the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina “on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals.”  Id.  
 50. Id. at 137–39. 
 51. Id. at 139–40 (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 140. 
 53. Justices Brady and Hudson disagreed with the majority’s opinion and concluded 
that they would have considered J.D.B. in custody for Miranda purposes as a consequence 
of both his age and the facts found by the trial court.  See id. at 144–46 (Brady, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing age with respect to the reasonable person standard as well as the extra 
protections that should be awarded to juveniles as general policy in the legal system); id. at 
150 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (discussing the reasonable person in the circumstances stand-
ard and how age should be a considered factor because it can inform courts how to view 
the circumstances as well as how to use “commonsense” determinations to evaluate issues 
regarding behavior and perception).  Both dissenters opined that age should be consid-
ered as a factor in the in-custody analysis because juvenile constitutional rights must be 
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granted certiorari “to determine whether the Miranda custody analysis 
includes consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age.”54 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional rights of 
adults being interrogated in custodial situations must be protected.55  
The Court has applied this rule to juvenile defendants as well and has 
historically viewed juvenile offenders as a special class of individuals 
that needs protection when being questioned.56  Elaborating on the 
protection of individual rights during an interrogation, the Court has 
formulated a two-part test that may be applied by law enforcement to 
any situation to assess if an individual is in custody.57  It has also ap-
plied this two-part test to situations involving juvenile offenders.58  In 
the past several years, the Supreme Court has carved out categorical 
rules for juvenile offenders in certain areas involving criminal sen-
tences, utilizing the same reasoning it applies when carving out ex-
ceptions for cognitively deficient adults.59   
A.  The Supreme Court Has a History of Protecting the Rights of 
Individuals Who Are Being Questioned in Custodial Situations, 
Construing Those Rights Based on Evolutions of the Law 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects the evolution of 
rights afforded to individuals in custodial situations.  The Court defin-
itively stated its position on the need for individuals in custody to be 
informed of their constitutional rights in Miranda v. Arizona60 and 
continued to define this right well after that case.61  Although the 
Court ultimately settled on a seemingly objective and general “ordi-
nary reasonable person” standard, specific decisions of the Court pri-
 
protected and because juveniles may be subject to more outside pressures and coercion 
than would adult offenders in similar circumstances.  Id. at 145 (Brady, J., dissenting); id. 
at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 54. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011). 
 55. See infra Part II.A. 
 56. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. See infra Part II.B.  
 59. See infra Part II.C.  
 60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 61. See infra Part II.A.2.  
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or to Miranda depicted that the Court historically considered juveniles 
in custodial situations under a different set of standards.62   
1.  Prior to the Development of the Miranda Test, the Supreme Court 
Determined That the Age of Juvenile Defendants Must Be 
Considered for Custody Purposes 
Prior to Miranda, when admissions of confessions were chal-
lenged, courts conducted an individual analysis to determine whether 
a person was in custody at the time of his confession.63  The federal 
courts previously “evaluated the admissibility of a suspect’s confession 
under a voluntariness test” rooted in due process; this test still exists 
in a limited form today.64  The due process test required courts to 
consider whether under the totality of the circumstances, the individ-
ual being questioned offered a voluntary confession or statement to 
the police.65  The test included an analysis of the individual’s subjec-
tive mindset concerning the questioning and whether that individual 
felt overwhelmed in such a circumstance.66  Although it is no longer 
applied by the courts, this subjective case-by-case due process test sug-
gests that juveniles were regarded differently from adults in the crim-
inal justice system.67   
The subjective test was applied in Haley v. Ohio,68 which specifical-
ly addressed the rights of juveniles.69  In Haley, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court determined that, under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the confessions of a juvenile, elicited while 
the individual was isolated and without the benefit of counsel, were 
inadmissible at trial.70  The police arrested and then questioned a fif-
teen-year-old boy, in isolation without any “friend or counsel . . . pre-
sent,” from midnight to 5:00 AM until he “confessed” to murder.71  
 
 62. See infra Part II.A.1.  
 63. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–34 (2000). 
 64. Id. at 433–34. 
 65. Id. at 434.  
 66. Id.  
 67. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948) (plurality opinion) (discussing the 
specific implications of considering the age and status of a juvenile for in-custody purpos-
es).  
 68. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
 69. Id. at 599–601. 
 70. Id. at 598–99. 
 71. Id. at 598. 
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Further, the defendant only received information regarding his con-
stitutional rights immediately before making a written statement of 
his confession but after several hours of interrogation.72  The plurality 
commented on the circumstances under which the juvenile defend-
ant’s questioning occurred and stated that “[w]hat transpired would 
make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved.  And 
when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before us, 
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.”73  The plurality 
noted that when a juvenile confesses to crimes under such circum-
stances of isolation and coercion, he may not be subjected to the 
same “standards of maturity” and understanding as an adult.74  Com-
paring adults and juveniles in such predicaments, the plurality stated, 
situations “[t]hat . . . would leave a man cold and unimpressed can 
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.”75  Ultimately, the 
plurality determined that the defendant’s confession was inadmissible 
under the specific circumstances.76  
Although Haley did not become the standard for juveniles be-
cause the decision did not garner majority support, the plurality’s rea-
soning offers substantial insight into early decisions that considered 
age and treated juveniles differently from adults in the criminal jus-
tice system.77  For example, the plurality made a distinction between 
the capacities of juvenile offenders to understand their personal situa-
tions when being questioned by the police and the capacity of adult 
offenders in the same situation.78  The plurality also stated that, due 
to a variety of factors, juveniles require support and counsel if they are 
to avoid the fear and coercion that may accompany official interroga-
tions; they should be permitted access to these resources so they are 
 
 72. Id.  The statement read as follows: 
[T]he law gives you the right to make this statement or not as you see fit.  It is 
made with the understanding that it may be used at a trial in court either for or 
against you or anyone else involved in this crime with you, of your own free will 
and accord, you are under no force or duress or compulsion and no promises 
are being made to you at this time whatsoever. 
Id. 
 73. Id. at 599.   
 74. Id. at 599–600.  
 75. Id. at 599. 
 76. Id. at 601.   
 77. Id. at 599–600.   
 78. Id. 
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not overwhelmed by the presence of law enforcement.79  The plurality 
considered a variety of factors to determine whether the defendant’s 
statements should be allowed into court including: the defendant’s 
age, the hours the questioning took place, the lack of counsel for the 
defendant, and the overall attitudes of the police officers toward the 
defendant during the interrogation.80  Finally, the plurality comment-
ed that even though the juvenile allegedly received a reading of his 
constitutional rights before he validated his written confession, in the 
absence of counsel or another source to inform him of his freedom to 
decline to answer any questions, it cannot be determined that he ap-
preciated or understood his actual freedom to end the interrogation 
or refuse police questioning.81  
2.  Miranda Warnings Were Developed as a Means to Protect the 
Rights of Individuals Being Questioned by Law Enforcement 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution affords 
an individual the right against self-incrimination,82 a crucial aspect of 
an individual’s ability to receive due process within the criminal jus-
tice system.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda analyzed this 
Amendment.83  In Miranda, the Court found that the police must in-
form an individual of his Fifth Amendment rights prior to question-
ing when they take him into custody.84  When advising the individual 
of these rights, the police officer must say, 
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot af-
ford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires.”85 
The Court also explained that an individual maintains the ability 
to exercise these particular rights throughout the custodial interroga-
 
 79. Id. at 600. 
 80. Id. at 600–01. 
 81. Id. at 601. 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 83. 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 479. 
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tion,86 but may waive these rights of his own free will.87  Consequently, 
if these rights are knowingly and intelligently waived by an individual 
in custody, then any statements acquired from him during the inter-
rogation following the warnings may be admitted into court.88  
In the course of developing Miranda rights, the Court discussed 
and analyzed specific policy concerns relating to the protections of 
the Fifth Amendment.  These concerns included an evaluation of the 
potential for corruption or coercion on the part of the police or oth-
ers.89  Specifically, such an evaluation may depend on the surround-
ing circumstances, such as when an individual is incarcerated, isolated 
from the general population, or pressured by law enforcement and 
then questioned for any length of time.90  The Court discussed the 
importance of allowing individuals to maintain the right against self-
incrimination in the specific circumstances surrounding an interroga-
tion because police officers are trained to use techniques to pressure 
and persuade the individual to make incriminating statements.91  Il-
lustrating this concern, the Court commented that “[a]n individual 
swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by 
antagonistic forces, and subjected to . . . techniques of persuasion . . . 
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”92  The Court 
also commented on its concern that when a person is “isolated” with 
the police the “compulsion to speak” and reveal incriminating infor-
mation may be “greater” than when an individual is surrounded by 
“impartial observers,” such as those found in a courtroom setting, who 
 
 86. Id.  In Miranda, the Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiat-
ed by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”  Id. at 444 (footnote omitted). 
 87. Id. at 479. 
 88. Id.  Otherwise, to admit these statements would be a violation of the right against 
self-incrimination.  Id. 
 89. Id. at 476–77. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 461.   
 92. Id.  The Court discussed police officers’ techniques of persuasion including 
“depriv[ing] [the individual] of every psychological advantage” by isolating him in an un-
familiar, private setting, “display[ing] an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt,” focusing 
on questions as to why the individual committed the particular crime to elicit details, show-
ing some hostility when kindness and false understanding of the individual being interro-
gated fails, acquiring confession via “trickery” or other coercion, and generally subjecting 
the individual to psychological pressure and tactics that cause him to make some kind of 
confession to the law enforcement official.  Id. at 449–57. 
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may “guard against intimidation or trickery.”93  With these policy con-
cerns in mind, the Supreme Court attempted to balance the needs of 
the police with the needs of those being questioned and determined 
that: (1) police officers require a clear set of procedural guidelines 
for when they must advise individuals of their rights, and (2) the 
rights of those individuals being questioned need to be protected.94   
The Court continued on to establish clear guidelines for police 
officers and courts to determine when statements during custodial in-
terrogations have been appropriately acquired and may be admitted 
into court.95  Miranda established that law enforcement is only re-
quired to read an individual his Fifth Amendment rights if he is actu-
ally in custody; if not, then the law enforcement officer has no obliga-
tion to do so, and any voluntary statements obtained from the 
individual may be admitted into court without issue.96  For example, 
in Oregon v. Mathiason,97 the Court determined that an adult suspect 
was never in custody when he went to the station at the request of the 
police, was not arrested, and was permitted to leave after question-
ing.98  An interview of this type does not warrant an issuance of Mi-
randa warnings because, although it took place in the station house—
an inherently “coercive environment”—the individual being ques-
tioned was not in custody.99  The Court commented that the types of 
coercive environments that Miranda was designed for are those in 
which “there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to 
render him ‘in custody.’”100  Although most interrogations and inter-
views with law enforcement take place in circumstances with coercive 
elements because of the presence of the police officer and because 
the individual being questioned may be charged with a crime, they do 
 
 93. Id. at 461.  
 94. Id. at 477–79.  The Court noted, however, that officers may continue to “seek out 
evidence in the field” by collecting preliminary statements, including voluntarily given 
statements, and other general information.  Id. at 477–78. 
 95. Id. at 478–79.  The Court justified the creation of Miranda warnings based on a 
need for “[p]rocedural safeguards” to protect the rights of individuals in custody.  Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). 
 98. Id. at 495. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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not morph into Miranda situations unless the custody requirement ex-
ists.101   
The Court later elaborated on the concept of the coercive envi-
ronment, what accompanies custodial questioning in such an envi-
ronment, and when particular instances will trigger the requirements 
outlined in Miranda.102  The Court stated the “relevant inquiry” for in-
custody purposes “is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position 
would have understood his situation.”103  Adding to the in-custody dis-
cussion, the Court also determined that the subjective views of the in-
dividual being questioned or the views of the police officer perform-
ing the questioning are not relevant for Miranda purposes.104  Rather, 
the need for Miranda warnings depends upon the total objective cir-
cumstances surrounding the interrogation.105  The Court commented 
that an objective factor contributing to the Miranda analysis consists 
of whether the individual has been taken into custody as described by 
the Miranda rule; that is, whether the individual’s freedom has been 
constrained in an overtly substantial way.106  The test does not require 
police officers to consider or anticipate “the frailties or idiosyncrasies 
of every person whom they question.”107  These later decisions directly 
defined the Miranda test as being rooted in objective circumstances108 
and a reasonable person standard.109 
Shortly after Miranda, the Court decided In re Gault110 and held 
that the right against self-incrimination applied to juvenile and adult 
offenders.111  In Gault, the defendant was accused of making “[l]ewd 
[p]hone [c]alls,” and, when questioned in a juvenile hearing, made 
incriminating statements without being informed of his constitutional 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433–34 (1984) (holding that any person in 
custody is entitled to the protections of Miranda regardless of the severity of the offense). 
 103. Id. at 442. 
 104. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 322–24.  The Court offered this commentary via a discussion of background 
cases that all commented on the custody aspect of Miranda.  See id. at 323– 24 (discussing 
past decisions on the in-custody test). 
 107. People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1967). 
 108. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323.  
 109. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). 
 110. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 111. Id. at 55. 
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rights; he was then incarcerated in a juvenile detention center based 
on the court’s determination of his status as a juvenile delinquent.112  
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that admissions or confessions made by a juvenile at a delin-
quency hearing may not be used to commit him to a detention center 
“in the absence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission 
was made with knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and would 
not be penalized for remaining silent.”113  Focusing mainly on the 
right against self-incrimination, the Court commented that it would 
be absurd if the rights protected by Miranda were afforded only to 
adult criminals and not to juvenile offenders.114  In conclusion, the 
Court acknowledged that a child may waive the rights protected by 
Miranda, but that an effective waiver may be less clear-cut when the 
defendant is a juvenile.115  The Court must determine whether the 
waiver was legitimate or was forced while the individual was in custo-
dy.116 
B.  Miranda Was Further Interpreted to Include a Two-Part Test That 
Has Been Applied to Juveniles and Adults and Which Aids Courts 
and Law Enforcement in Analyzing Whether an Individual Is in 
Custody  
Nearly three decades after the announcement that suspects must 
be provided with Miranda warnings during an in-custody interroga-
tion, the Supreme Court established a two-part test in Thompson v. 
Keohane.117  The test was meant to determine whether an individual 
has in-custody status for Miranda purposes.  The Court elaborated on 
the guidelines for the in-custody analysis as follows: (1) under what 
 
 112. Id. at 4–8. 
 113. Id. at 44, 55.  The Court also analyzed the purposes behind the right against self-
incrimination with respect to both juveniles and adults and commented that the right is 
based on the desire and need to ensure that admissions entered into court are “reasonably 
trustworthy” and “not the mere fruits of fear or coercion” resulting from an interrogation 
situation.  Id. at 47.  The right against self-incrimination focuses on such concerns because 
it is essential for the purposes of justice that confessions are “reliable expressions of the 
truth.”  Id.  Otherwise, the State may benefit from admissions not freely offered by the in-
dividual being questioned.  Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 55. 
 116. Id.  
 117. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).  
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circumstances did the interrogation occur; and (2) given those par-
ticular circumstances, “would a reasonable person have felt he” main-
tained the ability to end the interrogation and leave.118  Along with 
announcing this test, the Court also provided guidelines for its appli-
cation.  The Court stated that the first part of the test applied to the 
specific facts of the surrounding circumstances, and the second part 
of the test applied to the “controlling legal standard.”119  In the se-
cond prong of the test, the Court determined that the question to ask 
is whether an objective, reasonable person under the same circum-
stances would believe he was in custody as described by Miranda.120  
After the circumstances of the interrogation are analyzed and evalu-
ated with respect to what a reasonable person would believe, the court 
determines whether the interrogated individual was in custody for Mi-
randa purposes.121  
Over the past decade, the Court has considered when a juvenile 
is in custody under the test announced in Thompson.  For example, in 
Yarborough v. Alvarado,122 the police called a seventeen-year-old sus-
pected of murder and attempted robbery into the station house; he 
was transported there voluntarily by his parents.123  Once there, the 
parents of the defendant waited in the lobby of the station for the du-
ration of the two-hour interview.124  The suspect was not read his Mi-
randa rights.125  The Court determined that the defendant was not in 
custody for Miranda purposes because a reasonable person in similar 
circumstances would have felt he was free to end the questioning and 
leave the station.126  The Court provided specific reasons as to why this 
determination was correct: the police did not take Alvarado to the sta-
tion or compel him to appear there at a specific time, the police did 
not threaten him or his freedom of movement, the police did not 
 
 118. Id. at 112.  
 119. Id.  When the Court discussed the “controlling legal standard,” it commented that 
the test involved “a mixed question of law and fact,” thus the disputed issues should be 
viewed as such when they are on appeal or being reviewed.  Id. at 112–13 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  
 120. Id. at 113.   
 121. Id. at 112.  
 122. 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
 123. Id. at 656.   
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 664–65.   
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place him under arrest, his parents waited at the station for the inter-
view to conclude, he was free to return home at the conclusion of the 
questioning, and the questioning officer’s demeanor and attitude re-
mained sympathetic to the suspect’s situation.127  While the Court 
based its conclusion on these factors, it did offer the countervailing 
facts that could have led it to reach the opposite conclusion.  Those 
countervailing facts included: Alvarado was interviewed at the police 
station, an area commonly associated with in-custody proceedings, the 
interview lasted approximately two hours,128 the officer did not tell Al-
varado he was free to leave at any time, and his parents asked if they 
could be present for the interview but were not allowed.129  Despite 
the countervailing considerations, the Court ultimately determined 
that the lower court had not erred in finding that Alvarado had not 
been in custody for the purposes of Miranda.130 
The Court determined that the defendant’s age and inexperi-
ence did not need to be analyzed because of the objective nature of 
the Miranda test, which does not compel police officers to account for 
an individual’s psychological mindset, experiences, or age during an 
interrogation.131  Further, the Court commented that because of the 
test’s objectivity, Miranda cases differ from those in which juveniles 
are treated differently than adults.132  The Supreme Court ultimately 
concluded that if law enforcement had to treat juveniles differently, 
the Miranda “inquiry” would become focused “too much on the sus-
pect’s subjective state of mind and not enough on the ‘objective cir-
 
 127. Id.  To provide an example of the officer’s demeanor, the Court stated that the in-
terviewer asked Alvarado, at least twice, if he needed a break.  Id. at 664. 
 128. The Court noted that a two-hour-long this interview is not brief.  Id. at 665. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 666–69. 
 132. Id. at 667.  The Court did not name the specific cases where juveniles were treated 
differently, but the Court was likely referring to cases in different legal contexts, such as 
tort and contract law, where juveniles are sometimes evaluated under different standards 
as a consequence of their age and experience.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 14 (1918) (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to in-
cur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person’s 
eighteenth birthday.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (“If the actor is a 
child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that 
of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstanc-
es.”).  
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cumstances of the interrogation.’”133  In a separate concurring opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor agreed with the majority’s conclusion but sig-
naled the direction in which the Court would eventually head: “There 
may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the ‘custody’ 
inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona.”134   
C.  The Supreme Court Has Carved Out Separate, Categorical Rules for 
Juveniles Through Independent Analysis of the Position of Juveniles in 
the Context of the Death Penalty and Life in Prison Without Parole 
and Has Applied this Reasoning to Cognitively Deficient Adult 
Offenders 
The Supreme Court initially established categorical rules for ju-
veniles facing the death penalty and later applied the same reasoning 
when it limited the imposition of the death penalty on adult offenders 
with diminished mental capacity.135  Later, recognizing the limited 
mental capacity of juveniles and certain adults, the Court further re-
stricted the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders and 
also limited the possibility of a sentence of life without parole for ju-
venile offenders who did not commit homicide.136 
1.  The Court’s Early Decisions Regarding Juveniles Were Applied to 
Adult Offenders with Cognitive Deficiencies Due to Their 
Similarities in Mental Capacity and Development  
With its late 1980s decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma,137 the Su-
preme Court established categorical rules for juveniles in the death 
penalty context.138  In Thompson, the Court held that juveniles under 
the age of sixteen at the time of their committed offense may not be 
sentenced to the death penalty.139  In making this decision, the Court 
referenced specific policy, social, and psychological reasons, including 
the idea that capital punishment for juveniles does not further the 
goals of the criminal justice system and that juveniles are less culpable 
for the crimes they commit because they lack the same experience, 
 
 133. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) 
(per curiam)).  
 134. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 135. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 136. See infra Part II.C.2.  
 137. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 138. Id. at 838. 
 139. Id. 
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education, and intelligence as adults.140  The Court declined to pro-
hibit execution of individuals under the age of eighteen years,141 
thereby opening the possibility of future litigation in this area.  
The Supreme Court applied the reasoning developed in the con-
text of juvenile offenders to justify not imposing the death penalty on 
cognitively deficient adults.142  For example, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the case of Atkins v. Virginia,143 which involved a “mentally re-
tarded” adult offender sentenced to death.144  In Atkins, the Court de-
termined that sentencing mentally deficient individuals to death went 
against the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause.145  In making this decision, the Court applied reasoning simi-
lar to that of Thompson to adult offenders with cognitive disabilities.146  
Some of the cited factors included mentally deficient adults’ “dimin-
ished capacities to understand and process information,” their less-
ened ability “to control impulses,” and their incapacity to completely 
understand the overall surroundings and circumstances of a specific 
situation.147  The Court also noted that such offenders do not have 
the same moral culpability as adult offenders with normal cognitive 
 
 140. Id. at 836–38. 
 141. Id. at 838; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty 
on individuals who committed crimes at sixteen or seventeen years of age does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s provision against cruel and unusual punishment).  
 142. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (denoting mentally deficient adults 
as a separate class of offenders that may not have the death penalty imposed upon them).  
 143. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 144. Id. at 308–09.  The Court referred to both the American Association on Mental Re-
tardation’s definition of mental retardation and the American Psychiatric Association’s 
definition.  Id. at 308 n.3.  According to the Court, the American Association on Mental 
Retardation defined mental retardation as “refer[ring] to substantial limitations in present 
functioning.  It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, exist-
ing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adap-
tive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.  Mental retardation 
manifests before age 18.”  Id.  (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Court noted that the American Psychiatric Association’s definition of mental retardation is 
“similar” to the American Association on Mental Retardation’s definition.  Id.  
 145. Id. at 321.  
 146. Id. at 318.   
 147. Id. 
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abilities.148  Overall, the Court relied on social policy reasoning as well 
as psychological data when rendering this decision.149  The same in-
formation was later applied by the Court in criminal cases involving 
juvenile offenders and certain types of punishments, including capital 
punishment and life in prison without parole.150 
2.  Drawing on Previous Decisions, the Supreme Court Further 
Limited the Ability of Any Juvenile Offender to Receive the Death 
Penalty and also Limited the Possibility of Certain Juveniles 
Receiving Life Without Parole 
The Court again considered the issue of capital punishment with 
respect to juveniles in Roper v. Simmons151 when it held that the death 
penalty may never be imposed on individuals under the age of eight-
een at the time of their offense.152  Relying on Atkins, and its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court reasoned that juveniles should 
not face the death penalty because they lack the same maturity and 
cognitive ability as most adults, they are more susceptible to outside 
influences and peer pressure, and their personality and character are 
not as developed as those of adults.153  As a result of these factors, the 
Court concluded that juvenile criminal offenders are not among the 
worst offenders who merit the death penalty.154  It also commented 
that “[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too 
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to re-
ceive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”155  Further, 
the Court noted other areas in which juveniles have been restricted as 
a consequence of their age, commenting that “almost every State 
prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, 
or marrying without parental consent.”156  In Roper, the Court ulti-
 
 148. Id. at 320.  
 149. Id. at 320–21.   
 150. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (prohibiting the imposi-
tion of life without parole on juvenile nonhomicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (forbidding the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under 
the age of eighteen). 
 151. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
 152. Id. at 578. 
 153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70.  
 154. Id. at 570, 578.   
 155. Id. at 572–73. 
 156. Id. at 569. 
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mately created a categorical rule for juveniles, concluding that eight-
een is “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”157 
The Supreme Court also established specific rules for juveniles 
who receive life sentences without the possibility for parole.  For ex-
ample, in Graham v. Florida,158 the Court held that a life sentence 
without the possibility for parole may not be imposed on a juvenile 
offender who has not committed a homicide.159  The Court cited rea-
soning similar to that of Thompson and Roper, including a juvenile’s 
lack of maturity, diminished responsibility, and susceptibility to out-
side influences.160  It was further swayed by the amicus briefs submit-
ted in support of the petitioner, which demonstrated that there are 
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” includ-
ing differences in how behavior is controlled and in how the brain, 
and therefore the individual, matures.161  Again, like in Roper, the 
Court acknowledged that it was creating a categorical rule, which, 
while imperfect, offered a superior alternative to considering juve-
niles under the established adult standard.162  In establishing this cat-
egorical rule, the Court noted that its decision allows juvenile offend-
ers without a homicide conviction “a chance to demonstrate maturity 
and reform” because they still maintain the potential to grow and 
mentally develop.163 
The Court’s development of categorical rules for juveniles in 
Roper and Graham signified a movement toward setting aside juveniles 
as a discrete class within the criminal justice system.164  In both cases, 
reliance on the factors of age and experience motivated the Court’s 
decision.165  Paired with the Court’s method of evaluating in-custody 
situations and Miranda, the Court’s decisions in Roper and Graham 
point to the conclusion that the Court would revisit juvenile Miranda 
rights at some point.  In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court 
did just that.166 
 
 157. Id. at 574. 
 158. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 2034. 
 160. Id. at 2026. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 2030–32.   
 163. Id. at 2032–33.  
 164. Id. at 2034; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 165. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.   
 166. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).  
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING  
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a child’s 
age informs the custody analysis with respect to the child’s Miranda 
rights.167  Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor began by noting 
that when an individual—adult or otherwise—is in police custody, he 
is subject to increased pressure as a result of  the circumstances and 
atmosphere of the interrogation.168  These pressures may result in the 
utterance of statements not made by free choice.169  According to the 
Court, the psychological and physical isolation of being in custody 
creates an increased risk for juveniles specifically because of their 
age.170  Under Miranda, warnings must be given prior to custodial po-
lice interrogations to reduce the threat they pose to Fifth Amendment 
protections against self-incrimination.171  The Miranda inquiry focuses 
on an objective evaluation of how the surrounding circumstances 
would affect the beliefs of a reasonable person in the suspect’s posi-
tion concerning “his or her freedom to leave.”172  By not considering 
factors such as the individual’s mindset, the majority pointed out that 
police have clear guidance on when to administer Miranda warn-
ings.173  
The Court did not agree with the State’s assertion that a child’s 
age does not need to be considered in the custody analysis.174  Indeed, 
the Court commented that under some scenarios, a juvenile’s age 
“‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect’s posi-
tion ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave’” because in some 
cases where a reasonable adult may feel free to leave, a reasonable 
child would feel pressure to remain and continue answering ques-
tions.175  The Court then discussed that children generally lack the 
 
 167. Id. at 2399. 
 168. Id. at 2401. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2402 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (per curi-
am)).  
 173. Id.  The Court discussed how the objectivity of the test avoids burdening police 
with the job of trying to figure out the idiosyncrasies of every individual whom they ques-
tion and how those characteristics may affect that person’s state of mind as he is being 
questioned.  Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at  2402–03 (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325). 
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same responsibility, experience, and judgment skills as adults, there-
fore making them more prone to influence by external pressures.176  
Further, in other areas of law, such as in contract and tort law, chil-
dren are not expected to maintain the same capacity as adults or to 
exercise appropriate judgment and complete understanding of the 
events occurring around them.177   
The Court then stated that “[s]o long as the child’s age was 
known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been 
objectively apparent to any reasonable officer,” including age as a fac-
tor in the custody analysis does not create issues with the objective 
reasonable person standard so as to make it functionally inopera-
ble.178  In many instances involving juvenile suspects or offenders, the 
analysis of whether they were in custody would make no sense without 
some consideration of their age.179  The Court continued that it 
would not be appropriate to evaluate J.D.B.’s position from that “of a 
reasonable person of average years” because J.D.B.’s age necessarily 
affected how he viewed the circumstances of his interrogation.180   
Next, the Court rejected the State’s reasons as to why a juvenile’s 
age should not be considered.181  The Court rooted its reasoning pri-
marily in an analysis of how a juvenile’s cognitive abilities, maturity, 
and understanding differ from those of an adult.182  Finally, the Court 
reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and 
 
 176. Id. at 2403. 
 177. Id. at 2403–04. 
 178. Id. at 2404.  
 179. Id. at 2405.   
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 2406.   The State argued: “age is a personal characteristic,” as opposed to a 
circumstance external to the interrogation, and considering it results in the reasonable 
person test becoming too individually subjective; “age is irrelevant” because it focuses too 
closely on how a suspect may internalize a situation, and the in-custody test should not fo-
cus on the individual’s internalization of the interrogation but rather on how the interro-
gation would be viewed objectively; consideration of age will make it more difficult for the 
police and courts to apply the “one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test;” and finally that ex-
cluding age from the in-custody analysis does not present a threat to juveniles’ constitu-
tional due process rights because the due process test of voluntarily given statements ac-
counts for age.  Id. at 2406–08. 
 182. Id. at 2403–05. 
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remanded the case for “proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ion.183 
In dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Thomas, decried the majority’s opinion as “funda-
mentally inconsistent” with the main justification for the Miranda 
rule—that is, the need for a clear and easily applicable rule for all 
cases.184  Justice Alito’s dissent essentially followed the same lines of 
reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina: Age should not be considered 
because the Miranda rule and the objective reasonable person stand-
ard require courts to ignore personal, external, and individualized 
characteristics.185  He also commented that many individuals will dif-
fer from the “hypothetical reasonable person,” but that does not re-
quire a departure from the original test because these individuals 
have other legal recourse in claiming their confession was coerced or 
extracted involuntarily.186  Specifically, Justice Alito disagreed with the 
majority’s decision for three reasons: (1) many minors subjected to 
police questioning are near the “age of majority” and therefore the 
original Miranda rule would not be a “bad fit;” (2) the original Miran-
da in-custody rule is well-suited for juveniles because, although many 
police interrogations of juveniles occur in a “school setting,” the rule 
has always taken the setting into account; and (3) in cases “where the 
suspect is especially young,” such as in J.D.B., courts can instead eval-
uate the “incriminating statements” made under the “constitutional 
voluntariness standard” to ensure that they were not acquired by in-
appropriate means.187   
Justice Alito then discussed the history and purpose of Miranda, 
stating that the Miranda rule was intended to dispose of the confusing 
subjective “voluntariness” test that considered “[a]ll manner of indi-
vidualized, personal characteristics” of the suspect, including educa-
tion, mental health status, intelligence, and age.188  He recommended 
 
 183. Id. at 2408.  
 184. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 185. Compare id. at 2408–09, with In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795, 800-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2009), aff’d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), and In re J.D.B., 686 
S.E.2d 135, 139–40 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 186. J.B.D., 131 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 2410.  Justice Alito continued on to comment that after Miranda, the 
“[p]ersonal characteristics of suspects have consistently been rejected or ignored as irrele-
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that rather than consider the age of an individual and risk muddling 
the Miranda test, courts should focus on the voluntariness of juveniles’ 
statements; he believed that the “voluntariness inquiry” would ade-
quately account for juvenile offenders “unique needs” as a conse-
quence of being “mere children.”189  Justice Alito concluded that the 
“new, ‘reality’-based approach” adopted by the majority would even-
tually create a loss of the standard’s “clarity and ease of applica-
tion.”190 
IV.  ANALYSIS  
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court extended the Mi-
randa rule to include a consideration of age where juvenile offenders 
are concerned.191  The Court’s decision in J.D.B. relied on its previous 
decisions that considered juveniles a separate class of individuals.192  
The rule announced in J.D.B. appropriately considers the cognitive 
limitations of juveniles and allows courts and law enforcement offi-
cials to view juvenile offenders under the appropriate in-custody 
standard.193   
Contrary to what the dissent in J.D.B. posited, the majority’s deci-
sion does not destroy the Miranda rule, or obscure the two-part test to 
determine if an individual is in custody.194  Rather, the rule an-
nounced in J.D.B. merely expands the test for one class of offenders: 
juveniles.195  The Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. marks an appro-
priate, progressive move to further establish categorical rules for ju-
venile offenders because of their marked differences compared to av-
erage adult offenders.196  The reasoning behind J.D.B. may be 
appropriately applied to cognitively deficient adults due to the simi-
larities that this class shares with juvenile offenders.197  
 
vant under a one-size-fits-all reasonable-person standard” and, as such, the test should not 
be changed now to consider even the characteristic of age.  Id. at 2411, 2418. 
 189. Id. at 2418. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See infra Part IV.A.  
 192. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 193. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 194. See infra Part IV.B. 
 195. See infra Part IV.B.  
 196. See infra Part IV.C.1  
 197. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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A.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B Has Positively Changed the 
Application of Miranda to Juveniles 
In J.D.B., the Court appropriately formulated a test that accounts 
for the differences between juvenile and adult offenders in custodial 
situations and revived the historical arguments as to why juveniles 
should be treated differently.198  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
J.D.B. to expand the Miranda test to account for age will better protect 
the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders.199 
 
1.  The Majority’s Modification of the Miranda Rule Signifies Not 
Only a Reliance by the Court on Historical Arguments Concerning 
the Differences Between Adults and Juveniles but also Depicts the 
Evolving Manner in Which Juveniles Are Regarded in the 
Criminal Justice System 
In J.D.B., the Supreme Court expanded on the application of the 
right against self-incrimination by adding age to the “reasonable per-
son” analysis.200  The Court recognized the need to evaluate the cog-
nitive abilities of juveniles when it discussed how the specific context 
and surroundings of an interrogation may affect a juvenile offender’s 
belief that he may leave the interrogation when it compared the juve-
nile’s belief to an adult offender’s belief that he may depart from the 
same situation.201  The Court referenced Haley v. Ohio as an example 
of a case that appropriately categorized the experiences of juveniles as 
compared with adults.202  That is, the Court in Haley was correct to 
note that what “would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe 
and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.”203   
 
 198. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 199. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 200. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).  
 201. Id. at 2403.  The Court specifically discussed how the experiences of an adult may 
inform the individual that an interrogation is occurring and he need not feel pressured by 
the surrounding circumstances, whereas the experiences of a juvenile may result in the 
child being overwhelmed by the pressures and formalities associated with the interroga-
tion process.  Id.  
 202. Id. at 2397; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).   
 203. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599.   
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Developmental evidence supports this assertion and suggests that 
juveniles lack the same cognitive processing abilities as adults.204  Spe-
cifically, juveniles may be less inhibited in their actions and words as a 
consequence of a surge in neurological development through their 
mid- and late-teenage years.205  Paired with this decreased inhibition, 
juveniles are “more prone to erratic behavior than adults” and process 
situations that may be emotionally charged, such as an interrogation, 
differently than adults would.206  
It is useful to evaluate the circumstances surrounding J.D.B.’s 
questioning in light of Haley and specific cognitive evidence.  J.D.B.’s 
perception of the situation may be gathered from his specific state-
ment to Officer DiCostanzo concerning “whether he would still be in 
trouble” if he returned the stolen items and his confession when Of-
ficer DiCostanzo brought up the threat of being placed in a juvenile 
detention center.207  It is likely that any juvenile under the circum-
stances of an interrogation in a closed room, where he was being 
urged by an adult in a position of authority to “do the right thing,” 
would be influenced by the fear and pressure of the situation.208  Such 
fear and pressure may compel the juvenile to act on his first impulse 
 
 204. See Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCI. 596 (2004) 
(discussing how the brain is still developing in the middle-to-late teenage years and the 
differences between adult and juvenile brains and cognitive function).  
 205. Id. at 596–97.  This development is characterized by what has been labeled as a re-
organization and “pruning” of neurons that “shape[s] the brain’s neural connections for 
adulthood” and results in a decrease of impulsivity as well as better integration of infor-
mation from the surrounding environment.  Id.  This reorganization is signified through-
out adolescence by an increase in development of white matter in the brain and a reces-
sion of gray matter.  Id. 
 206. Id. at 599.  Specifically, the amygdala, “a brain region that processes emotions,” 
functions differently in juveniles than it does in adults.  Id.  Research indicates that juve-
niles process fear and other emotions differently than adults do because of their decreased 
cognitive inhibition, which may contribute to different responses in environments where 
strong emotions are present.  Id.  
 207. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399–400 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 208. See Beckman, supra note 204, at 597 (elaborating via experiment on how the ado-
lescent brain responds differently to outside stimuli than the adult brain does); Catherine 
Sebastian et al., Development of the Self-Concept During Adolescence, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE 
SCI. 441, 443 (2008) (discussing how when compared to adults, adolescents have an in-
creased awareness of others’ perspectives, leading them to interpret social encounters dif-
ferently).   
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and confess, whether he committed a crime or not.209  The possibility 
of being “evaluated” by others in the room210 may also increase pres-
sure for the juvenile to do what he perceives to be the right thing un-
der the circumstances and to state what he thinks the adults wish to 
hear.  The juvenile’s cognitive capacity may not allow him to stop the 
questioning on his own because he feels as though he must answer 
the questions posed by his interrogators in order to please them and 
escape the situation.211  These cognitive processes and the surround-
ing circumstances, therefore, make it reasonable to assume that a ju-
venile in a position similar to that of J.D.B. is unlikely to realize that 
he may decline to answer any questions posed to him.  Without con-
sidering age in regard to the individual’s in-custody status, a law en-
forcement officer may not realize that a juvenile would consider him-
self in custody and thus the officer may commit a mistake that would 
render the juvenile’s statements inadmissible at trial.212   
2.  The Supreme Court Correctly Expanded the Miranda Standard to 
Include an Evaluation of Age, While the Dissent Failed to 
Recognize That Such a Rule Does Not Completely Destroy the 
Traditional Miranda Test 
The Court correctly determined in J.D.B. that juveniles must be 
evaluated differently than adults in interrogation situations because of 
differences in mental capacity, judgment, and understanding.213  The 
circumstances when a juvenile has waived his Miranda rights must be 
scrutinized differently because the cognitive abilities of juveniles are 
different than those of adults, especially where outside pressures are 
 
 209. See Beckman, supra note 204, at 597 (“[T]eens’ impulse control is not on a par with 
adults’.”); Sebastian et al., supra note 208, at 443 (noting that children are more self-
conscious than adults).  
 210. See Sebastian et al., supra note 208, at 443 (discussing the “imaginary audience,” a 
phenomenon in adolescents whereby they “believe that others are constantly observing 
and evaluating them, even if this is not actually the case” (citation omitted)).  
 211. See id. at 444 (explaining the enhanced need among adolescents for positive social 
feedback). 
 212. See id. at 2401 (explaining that, under the Miranda test, “if a suspect makes a state-
ment during custodial interrogation, the burden is on the Government to show, as a pre-
requisit[e] to the statement's admissibility as evidence . . . that the defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights [against self-incrimination]” (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 213. Id. at 2403–04.  
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apparent.214  The Supreme Court’s adoption of such a rule, and the 
policy reasons behind it, comports with early cases in which the Court 
encountered the issue of youthful offenders receiving, or not receiv-
ing, readings of their rights when being questioned.215   
Conversely, the dissent characterized the Supreme Court’s previ-
ous view on how to evaluate questioning of juveniles in custodial or 
potentially custodial situations as problematic because it shifted the 
in-custody test by considering individual, external characteristics.216  
The dissent described the proper Miranda test as a “one-size-fits-all 
reasonable-person” test that must be adhered to regardless of any 
characteristics of the offender or any surrounding circumstances.217  
Nevertheless, Justice Alito admitted that “many suspects who are un-
der 18 will be more susceptible to police pressure than the average 
adult.”218  Findings from developmental studies support this assertion 
as well.219  Despite this acknowledgment, the dissent entered into a 
misguided discussion of how much farther the Miranda test may be 
expanded now that the majority has essentially opened the door to 
considering subjective factors.220  Regardless, the majority’s arguments 
prevailed and, coupled with developmental research data, provide a 
clear set of reasons as to why juveniles should be afforded a different 
rule where Miranda rights are concerned.221 
 
 214. See Sebastian et al., supra note 208, at 443 (noting that children are more self-
conscious than adults); see also Brief of Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 
(2011) (No. 09-11121) (“[J]uveniles are uniquely susceptible to making unreliable state-
ments during the pressure-cooker of police interrogation.”).   
 215. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Court’s historical treatment of juveniles for in-
custody purposes).  
 216. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 217. Id. Justice Alito’s dissent made no mention of how not accounting for age can cause 
problems for law enforcement officials; instead, he discussed what he believed to be the 
operational flaws associated with the new rule.  See id. at 2418 (concluding the new formu-
lation of the Miranda test for juveniles will result in a loss of the test’s straightforward and 
easy application). 
 218. Id. at 2413. 
 219. Beckman, supra note 204, at 597 (analyzing why adults generally have better im-
pulse control than juveniles).  
 220. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2413–15.   
 221. See id. at 2398–99 (majority opinion) (holding that “a child’s age properly informs 
the Miranda custody analysis”); see also supra Part III (discussing the Court’s reasoning).  
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. Does Not Destroy the Ability of 
Police Officers to Implement the Two-Part Test from Thompson to 
Effectively Question Juveniles 
The Court’s addition of age still comports with the two-part test 
announced in Thompson v. Keohane for determining whether an indi-
vidual is in custody for Miranda purposes.222  The Court simply added 
another factor for officers to consider during custodial interrogations; 
it does not require officers to consider any subjective characteristics of 
the individual.223  After J.D.B., the proper application of the Thompson 
test would require an officer to: (1) evaluate the circumstances of the 
interrogation;224 and, (2) given that set of circumstances, determine 
whether a reasonable person of the same age as the juvenile would be-
lieve he could stop the interrogation and leave.225 
Under this test, a situation might arise where a juvenile would 
not need to be Mirandized because, under the circumstances, even an 
individual of his age would understand the situation and would not 
feel compelled to remain present for questioning.226  An analysis of 
 
 222. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); see also supra text accompanying 
note 118 (describing the two-part test).  Applying the second part of this test, the Court 
noted that “[i]n some circumstances, a child’s age ‘would have affected how a reasonable 
person’ in the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’”  J.D.B., 131 
S. Ct. at 2402–03 (citation omitted).  
 223. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404.  The Court stated that the inclusion of age in “the custody 
analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances ‘unknowable’ to them, nor to 
‘anticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncrasies’ of the particular suspect whom they question.”  
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).   
 224. See id. at 2411 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Relevant factors . . . include[] . . . where the 
questioning occurred, how long it lasted, what was said, any physical restraints placed on 
the suspect’s movement, and whether the suspect was allowed to leave when the question-
ing was through.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 225. See id. at 2398–99 (majority opinion) (holding that “age properly informs the Mi-
randa custody analysis”); note 118 and accompanying text (outlining Thompson’s two-part 
test).   
 226. For example, imagine a circumstance where a police officer asked a child a ques-
tion on the street and the child somehow incriminated himself.  Add to this the fact that 
the child was perhaps walking to the bus stop and the officer walked along with him for a 
chat and the child got onto the bus and left.  The child was never detained, never placed 
anywhere without his consent and merely answered questions that the officer posed to 
him.  This may be a more feasible situation for an older youth (perhaps in his late teens) 
than for a young child who may feel he must talk to the police officer or face punishment. 
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one of the Court’s previous decisions, Yarborough v. Alvarado, depicts 
how the revised Thompson standard would apply to an already decided 
case.227  The Court’s original decision in Alvarado informed courts 
and law enforcement officials about when a juvenile may think he is 
not in custody because he, or his legal guardians, voluntarily submit-
ted to questioning.228  Employing the revised Thompson standard in 
these circumstances, it is evident that the juvenile did not use his own 
capacity to submit to interrogation.  The decision of the parents vali-
dated the questioning as appropriate, and the juvenile could view the 
adult presence as an extra safeguard.229  Under these circumstances, 
the juvenile offender may not be found in custody because a reasona-
ble person of the same age would feel he could stop the interroga-
tion. 
While Alvarado demonstrates how the revised Thompson standard 
could be applied, J.D.B. elaborates on how this revised standard is 
necessary to avoid absurd results.  The circumstances in J.D.B. differed 
from the circumstances in Alvarado for several reasons: J.D.B.’s guard-
ians were not called into the school or at all; J.D.B. was questioned in 
an official setting but was not taken to the station house; he did not 
independently leave class when summoned to the office, rather the 
school security guard accompanied him as an escort; and he was free 
to leave at the end of the interrogation after he gave Officer Di-
Costanzo his statement.230  Under these operative facts, the Supreme 
Court asked, as it must under Miranda and Thompson, how the ideal 
“reasonable person of average years” would understand such a situa-
tion if he occupied J.D.B.’s position.231  Specifically, the Court que-
ried, 
how would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after 
being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a 
uniformed school resource officer; being encouraged by his 
assistant principal to “do the right thing”; and being warned 
 
 227. Alvarado was decided under the original Thompson standard; it provides a good ex-
ample of how the test was applied and how the revised Thompson test may be applied in a 
similar situation. 
 228. Id. at 663–65. 
 229. See id. at 664–65 (describing how the presence of Alvarado’s parents in the lobby of 
the police station weighed in favor of Alvarado being found not in custody). 
 230. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399–400. 
 231. Id. at 2405. 
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by a police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention 
and separation from his guardian and primary caretaker?232 
The Court correctly recognized that J.D.B.’s situation would be “ab-
surd[]” to an adult and therefore the test for juveniles must be altered 
to account for these differences.233 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. Adhered to the Progressive 
Trend of Establishing Categorical Rules for Juvenile Offenders and 
May Be Applied to Another Class of Offenders 
The Court’s alteration of the Miranda test in J.D.B. adds the fac-
tor of age for courts and law enforcement to consider, and requires a 
focus on psychological developmental and cognitive data.234  The 
Court’s decision in J.D.B. indicates a continuing trend of recognizing 
juveniles’ stage of development and of creating categorical rules for 
juvenile offenders.235  Further, based on the Court’s reasoning in 
J.D.B., the test formulated by the Court could apply to another dis-
crete category of offenders: cognitively deficient adults.236 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. Adhered to the Positive 
Trend of Defining Juveniles as a Separate Class which Must Be 
Considered Differently Under Existing Legal Principles in the 
Criminal Justice System 
As the Court articulated in J.D.B. and other decisions, juveniles 
must be afforded differential treatment within the criminal justice sys-
tem.237  The decision in J.D.B. marks a positive milestone in juvenile 
criminal justice policy: the recognition that juvenile offenders must be 
viewed under a separate Miranda rule than the rule applied to 
adults.238  Such a rule allows the criminal justice system to operate on 
a more individual level and account for the special position of juve-
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.  
 234. See supra Part IV.A. 
 235. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 236. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 237. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).  
 238. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399; cf. id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Mi-
randa test is properly a one-size-fits-all analysis).  
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nile offenders.239  While some juveniles have vast experiences with the 
criminal justice system, many others do not have those experiences, 
and therefore they may not realize their rights in an interrogation sit-
uation.240  Although the possibility exists that this new rule may cause 
police officers to Mirandize individuals they normally would not,241 
consideration of age for custody purposes does not put undue burden 
on police officers.  Likely, many officers already make such judgment 
calls concerning the age of individual juvenile offenders they are 
about to question; such a determination informs the officers of 
whether the child’s guardian needs to be contacted and how the in-
terrogation should proceed.242  Further, the rule benefits police offic-
ers because it encourages them to Mirandize individuals and ensures 
that collected statements will not be summarily rejected for lack of fol-
lowing procedures.243  Overall, the rule announced in J.D.B. has posi-
tive policy implications, providing juveniles with better protection of 
their rights and furthering the Supreme Court’s trend of establishing 
separate rules for juveniles.244  
The rule in J.D.B. reinforces the Roper and Graham rules that treat 
juveniles differently.245  All three of these rules were created through 
the same lines of reasoning: Individuals under the age of eighteen do 
not maintain the same cognitive processing capacity as adults and 
therefore should not be treated in exactly the same way as adult of-
 
 239. See Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass’n, and the Mo. Psychol. Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 4–15, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (discussing juveniles as a 
group and how their developmental position affects their ability to comprehend and un-
derstand their situation and involvement within the criminal justice system).  
 240. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402–08 (majority opinion).   
 241. See Robert Barnes, Child Suspects’ Age Crucial to Reading of Rights, Justices Rule, WASH. 
POST, June 16, 2011, at A2 (reporting on the concern that the Court’s decision would 
cause police officers to give more warnings than necessary). 
 242. See Brief of Juv. L. Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21–31, 
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121) (describing existing requirements for police officers 
to consider age).  
 243. See J.D.B. 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (acknowledging that the consideration of age erects a 
barrier to the admission of a defendant’s incriminating statements at trial).  
 244. See id. at 2399 (protecting juveniles in interrogatory situations); Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life without parole on a juve-
nile offender who did not commit a homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 
(2005) (forbidding the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under the age of 
eighteen).   
 245. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
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fenders.246  Rather, based on the developmental differences between 
juveniles and adults, juveniles should be afforded more protections 
within the criminal justice system because they may fail to compre-
hend and react to certain situations in the same way as adults.247  De-
velopmental research also provides further insight as to why juveniles 
should be treated differently than adult offenders in the criminal are-
na: Because of differences between the developing juvenile brain and 
the adult brain, juveniles are more likely to engage in risky and im-
pulsive behavior, the consequences of which they may not recognize 
until well after the fact.248  While such developmental differences 
should not provide juveniles a “free-pass” to commit crime, it makes 
sense to evaluate juvenile offenders under a different standard.  The 
creation of rules like those found in J.D.B., Roper, and Graham provide 
very limited, yet appropriate, accommodations for juvenile offend-
ers.249  While these rules may seem more lenient or subjective for ju-
veniles, they still hold them to a standard by which they may be 
brought into court and punished for their crimes.250  Ultimately, the 
creation of these “categorical” rules provides law enforcement and 
courts with better guidelines on how to appropriately evaluate juve-
nile offenders within the criminal justice system. 
2.  Although the Supreme Court’s Alteration of the Miranda Test Does 
Not Open It to Many Additional Subjective Standards for Adult 
Offenders, the Rule Announced in J.D.B. Could Apply to Adult 
Offenders Suffering from Cognitive Disabilities  
The change in the Miranda analysis with respect to juveniles does 
not open the Miranda test to the addition of other elements with re-
spect to normal adult offenders.251  Moreover, it appears the Court 
still intended for other procedural rules from adult cases to apply to 
 
 246. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404–05; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–
70.  
 247. Beckman, supra note 204, at 597. 
 248. Daniel Romer, Adolescent Risk Taking, Impulsivity, and Brain Development: Implications 
for Prevention, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 263, 263–64 (2010).  
 249. See supra note 244.    
 250. None of the rules in J.D.B., Roper, or Graham seek to absolve juveniles from crimes; 
they merely afford juveniles extra protection within the justice system by accounting for 
their age.  See supra note 244.  
 251. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (discussing the continu-
ing objectivity of the Miranda test).   
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juvenile offenders.252  Thus, the addition of age merely informs the 
Miranda analysis in juvenile cases.253  The majority defended its posi-
tion when it commented that “a child’s age differs from other person-
al characteristics that, even when known to police, have no objectively 
discernible relationship to a reasonable person’s understanding of his 
freedom of action.”254  Like an adult offender, courts and law en-
forcement do not need to consider the juvenile’s prior experience 
within the criminal justice system; they merely need to evaluate if, at 
the time of the questioning, the child’s age was known or would have 
been known under the circumstances to a “reasonable officer.”255  
The Court also stated that the new rule applies specifically to juveniles 
and does not result in the wholesale destruction of the Miranda analy-
sis imagined by the dissent.256  The majority stated, in short, that the 
rule announced in J.D.B. does not change the Miranda analysis for 
adult offenders.  
While the decision in J.D.B. comports with the Supreme Court’s 
other decisions regarding juveniles and only adds a single factor to 
the Miranda analysis, it is possible that cognitively deficient adults 
could invoke the rule in J.D.B.257  In particular, the rule may be ap-
plied to those individuals who have disorders that are characterized by 
a lack of inhibition or inability to control impulsive behavior.258  For 
example, the following scenario may be imagined: An offender who 
 
 252. Id. at 2406 (discussing the newly formulated rule and how age may not be deter-
minative in some cases).  The Court further refuted the State’s and the dissent’s argu-
ments by stating that the addition of age does not open the door for a further considera-
tion of other subjective characteristics for Miranda purposes.  Id. at 2406–08. 
 253. Id. at 2399. 
 254. Id. at 2404.  
 255. Id. at 2404–06.  
 256. Id. at 2406–07.   
 257. Such a scenario may be imagined in a case such as Atkins v. Virginia, where the 
Court based its decision on evidence supporting decreased metal capacity of cognitively 
deficient adults.  536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002). 
 258. An expansion of the test announced by the majority in J.D.B. is imagined by Justice 
Alito, who decried the majority’s decision as opening up the floodgates to a loss of “clarity 
and ease of application” of the Miranda standard.  J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., dis-
senting).  The majority of the Court did make reference to the mental capacities of juve-
nile offenders when compared to normal adult offenders; thus it is easy to draw similarities 
between juvenile offenders and cognitively deficient adult offenders.  Id. at 2403 (majority 
opinion).  
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has an IQ that would classify that individual as cognitively deficient259 
commits an offense; to use the example from J.D.B., he commits a 
burglary.  His cognitive impairment causes him to have psychological 
and intellectual abilities similar to that of a child,260 and the individual 
does not understand why he is called into his supervisor’s office at 
work the next day (or asked to come to the police station of his own 
accord).  Like J.D.B., he is seated in a room with one or more police 
officers, and maybe even other authority figures he is familiar with, 
such as a supervisor or manager.  Then he is asked a battery of ques-
tions in a closed setting.  Feeling confused, pressured, and over-
whelmed by the situation, the individual is coerced into confessing to 
the crime without ever receiving any reading of his rights.261  Similar 
to J.D.B., this individual is charged with the confessed crime and must 
appear before a court.  At this point, the facts in this fictional case ap-
pear similar to those of J.D.B.’s except with regard to the alleged of-
fender’s physical age.  While the alleged offender is physically over 
the age of eighteen, his mental state and cognitive understanding may 
be compared to that of J.D.B.’s; that is, the alleged offender belongs 
to a group that is characterized by being easily susceptible to sugges-
tion and coercion.262 
After the hypothetical offender’s arrest, he meets with his attor-
ney who, realizing his client’s plight, wishes to utilize the rule from 
J.D.B. and exclude his client’s statements based on his lack of under-
standing of the situation when he made his confession.263  At this 
point, a judge would need to consider whether the rule in J.D.B. 
should be extended to include “psychologically juvenile” adult of-
 
 259. For a definition, see supra note 144. 
 260. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 
34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 20–21 (2010) (equating the cognitive abilities of mentally deficient 
adult offenders with the cognitive abilities of juvenile offenders in interrogation situa-
tions); Michael J. O’Connell et al., Miranda Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation 
and the Effects of Feedback Style on Suggestibility, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 359, 359–60 (2005) (dis-
cussing the limited abilities of cognitively deficient adults to fully understand their consti-
tutional rights in an interrogation situation). 
 261. O’Connell et al., supra note 260, at 359–60. 
 262. Id. at 360–61.   
 263. See Kassin et al., supra note 260 at 8–9, 20–21 (discussing the inability of both cog-
nitively deficient adults and juveniles to fully or even partially understand Miranda warn-
ings and the situations in which they are administered).   
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fenders.264  Similarities may be drawn between the hypothetical of-
fender and a juvenile offender in the same situation based on the 
cognitive data and characteristics of juveniles cited by the Supreme 
Court in J.D.B.265  Indeed, reasoning applied to cognitively deficient 
adults has often been applied to juveniles.266  Under this reasoning, it 
would follow that juvenile offenders and cognitively deficient adult 
offenders fall into the same class: a class composed of individuals who, 
although they may have different physical ages, have similar cognitive 
ages and abilities and therefore should be afforded the same Miranda 
protections under the law.267  Without such protections, cognitively 
impaired individuals often do not recognize their ability to invoke 
their constitutional rights or may be pressured into making inappro-
priate or false confessions that are later used against them in court.268  
Extending the test formulated in J.D.B. to cognitively impaired adults 
would provide an extra layer of protection to them, thereby affording 
them justice within the criminal justice system.269 
Two potential issues arise when the rule from J.D.B. is applied to 
adult offenders: (1) how will police officers know they are questioning 
 
 264. For support of this proposition, the judge would likely want to refer to the discus-
sion of the cognitive abilities of juveniles in J.D.B. as well as secondary sources that support 
comparisons between juvenile offenders and adults with cognitive deficiencies.  See J.D.B. 
v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403–04 (2011) (analyzing how a juvenile’s cognitive 
capacity differs from that of an adult); see also supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(providing an example of secondary sources that compare cognitively deficient adults to 
juveniles).  
 265. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–04 (providing characteristics of juveniles). 
 266. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (deciding that cognitively defi-
cient adult offenders may not be sentenced to the death penalty), with Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 559–60, 578 (2005) (adopting Atkins’s reasoning and determining that the 
death penalty may never be imposed on juveniles).  
 267. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 8–9, 20–21 (discussing the similarities between 
juvenile offenders and adult offenders with cognitive disabilities in custodial, interrogatory 
situations).  
 268. See, e.g., Robert Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: 
The List Keeps Growing, 46 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 468 (2008) (offering 
examples of fifty-three false confessions acquired from individuals with various cognitive 
deficiencies while in  custody).   
 269. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 30–31 (discussing two other methods for protec-
tion: (1) mandatory attorney presence during questioning, and (2) specialized training of 
law enforcement officials and other individuals involved in the criminal justice system who 
come into contact with cognitively deficient adults). 
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a cognitively deficient adult, and (2) how will the application of the 
J.D.B. rule affect the ability of police to acquire confessions from 
guilty individuals and convicted criminals?  While these two issues are 
important to contemplate, appropriate remedial measures may be 
taken to diminish the impact of J.D.B. in the interrogation of cogni-
tively impaired adults.270   
With regard to the first issue, police departments maintain a 
number of options to educate officers on how to identify adults with 
potential cognitive or psychological deficiencies.271  For example, po-
lice departments could ask each individual taken into custody to 
complete a short intake sheet before questioning commences.272  Alt-
hough the possibility exists that such education may not always be 
enough to allow officers to easily identify adults suffering from mental 
disabilities, it would provide officers with the ability to discern wheth-
er an individual who appears cognitively “normal” is really operating 
under a diminished capacity.273  Opponents of the application of the 
J.D.B. rule may view this measure as placing too much responsibility 
on the officers performing the questioning; such education, however, 
may decrease the skepticism that surrounds “voluntary” confessions, 
however, and may result in more appropriate convictions and fewer 
false confessions on the part of individuals who suffer from cognitive 
deficiencies.274  Further, specialized training for police officers would 
afford them the opportunity to appropriately interrogate cognitively 
 
 270. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 25 (stating that there is renewed support for the 
reform of the interrogation process and renewed interest in preventing false confessions).   
 271. See Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Un-
derstanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 
212, 218–19 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of educating law enforcement officers to 
understand the characteristics of mental retardation); see also Information for Law Enforce-
ment and Magistrates, THE ARC NORTH CAROLINA, http://www.arcnc.org/law-enforcement-
and-magistrates (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Training Materials] (providing a list 
of resources that law enforcement agencies may use for identification training, including a 
handout that lists common traits, attributes, and behaviors that individuals with cognitive 
disabilities exhibit). 
 272. See Training Materials, supra note 271 (containing a handout with an intake sheet 
attached that may be manipulated depending on department needs). 
 273. Id.   
 274. Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 9. 
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impaired individuals and, as a result, it may curb the abuses of power 
during the interrogation process.275 
With regard to the second factor, reform measures may be un-
dertaken by the entire justice system to ensure that inappropriate 
confessions are not acquired from cognitively deficient adults.276  
Such suggested reform measures include: mandatory taping of all 
formal interrogations,277 the presence of an attorney or guardian at all 
interrogations,278 a revamping of specific interrogation techniques 
employed by law enforcement officials,279 as well as other techniques 
and measures.280  While opponents of the application of the J.D.B. 
rule to adults may not be completely placated by these measures and 
may argue that they defeat the purposes of Miranda and unnecessarily 
complicate the justice system, such innovations and developments are 
necessary in order to protect all individuals who enter the system.281  
Further, such measures do not per se change the Miranda analysis but 
instead add more safeguards and checks to the criminal justice sys-
 
 275. See Everington & Fulero, supra note 271, at 212, 218–19 (emphasizing the need for 
heightened scrutiny of confessions given by cognitively deficient adults); see also Kassin, et 
al., supra note 260, at 12–13 (discussing the abuse of power by law enforcement officers 
during interrogations). 
 276. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 25 (noting the “renewed calls for caution regard-
ing confessions and the reform of interrogation practices”).   
 277. Id. at 25–27.  In February 2011, the American Bar Association approved the Uni-
form Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act, which was created by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws.  ABA House of Delegates 
Resolution 109C, Report: Uniform Electronic Custodial Interrogations Act (2011).  This Act pur-
ports to require the “electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation process by 
law enforcement,” but also permits states to decide what types of crimes this Act applies to 
and how the recording will be accomplished.  Id.  The goal of this Act is to decrease the 
instance of false confessions and to improve the integrity of the criminal justice system as a 
whole.  Id.  
 278. Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 30.   
 279. Id. at 27–30.  
 280. Other techniques may include continuing or extra education and training for law 
enforcement on how to address interrogation situations in which they may be questioning 
a cognitively deficient adult.  See supra text accompanying notes 271–273; see also Training 
Materials, supra note 271.  
 281. See Everington & Fulero, supra note 271, at 212–13, 217–19 (describing the vulner-
abilities of suspects with mental retardation and suggesting protections); Kassin et al., su-
pra note 260, at 30–31 (describing two ways to protect vulnerable suspect populations dur-
ing interrogations).   
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tem, therefore enhancing the credibility of confession evidence.282  
Overall, such remedies provide guidelines and issues for law enforce-
ment and courts to consider and aid law enforcement’s job of acquir-
ing confessions and convicting criminals.283 
V.  CONCLUSION  
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court expanded the Mi-
randa in-custody test for juveniles to include a consideration of age.284  
The Court appropriately expanded the Miranda test by relying upon 
the differences between adult and juvenile offenders and by referenc-
ing historical arguments that supported this expansion.285  The rule 
announced in J.D.B. neither destroys the Miranda test nor the two-step 
Thompson test for in-custody determinations; rather, it merely expands 
the rule for one class of offenders.286  Overall, with J.D.B., the Court 
continued to move in a forward direction by considering juveniles’ 
cognitive limitations and by establishing separate categories of rules 
for juvenile offenders.287  Finally, there are limited instances when the 
rule in J.D.B. may be applied to another discrete class of offenders, 
specifically cognitively deficient adults.288   
 
 282. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 9 (discussing the skepticism of confession evi-
dence).   
 283. See id. at 31 (arguing that more attention to the problem of false confessions, cou-
pled with reform efforts, will better enable police to make accurate decisions).    
 284. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011) 
 285. See supra Part IV.A.  
 286. See supra Part IV.B.  
 287. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 288. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
